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Abstract. We study the problem of revenue maximization in the marketing model for social networks in-
troduced by (Hartline, Mirrokni, Sundararajan, WWW ’08). In this setting, a digital product is sold to a
set of potential buyers under positive externalities, and the seller seeks for a marketing strategy, namely an
ordering in which he approaches the buyers and the prices offered to them, that maximizes his revenue.
We restrict our attention to the Uniform Additive Model and mostly focus on Influence-and-Exploit (IE)
marketing strategies. We obtain a comprehensive collection of results on the efficiency and the approxima-
bility of IE strategies, which also imply a significant improvement on the best known approximation ratios
for revenue maximization. Specifically, we show that in the Uniform Additive Model, both computing the
optimal marketing strategy and computing the best IE strategy areNP-hard for undirected social networks.
We observe that allowing IE strategies to offer prices smaller than the myopic price in the exploit step leads
to a measurable improvement on their performance. Thus, we show that the best IE strategy approximates
the maximum revenue within a factor of 0.911 for undirected and of roughly 0.553 for directed networks.
Moreover, we present a natural generalization of IE strategies, with more than two pricing classes, and show
that they approximate the maximum revenue within a factor of roughly 0.7 for undirected and of roughly
0.35 for directed networks. Utilizing a connection between good IE strategies and large cuts in the under-
lying social network, we obtain polynomial-time algorithms that approximate the revenue of the best IE
strategy within a factor of roughly 0.9. Hence, we significantly improve on the best known approximation
ratio for revenue maximization to 0.8229 for undirected and to 0.5011 for directed networks (from 2/3 and
1/3, respectively, by Hartline et al.).
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1 Introduction
An important artifact of the Internet is the appearance of Social Networks. For the first time, we posses
an account of the friendship network for millions of people. This information is invaluable for targeted
advertising, personalized recommendations, and in general, for enhancing business intelligence. How-
ever, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the perceived value of Social Networks and the actual
revenue they generate. For instance, Facebook is valued by Goldman Sachs at $50 billions, but its
actual revenue is estimated at $2.2 billions by eMarketer. The widespread belief is that much of the
commercial potential of Social Networks remains unexploited.
This premise has motivated a significant volume of research in the direction of monetizing Social
Networks. Recent research has studied the impact of externalities in a variety of settings (see e.g. [13,
4, 1, 3, 6, 5, 12, 9]). In this work, we are interested in the design of efficient marketing strategies that
exploit positive externalities and maximize the seller’s revenue. We focus on the setting where the
utility of the product depends inherently on the scale of the product’s adoption. E.g. the value of a
social network depends on the fraction of the population that uses it on a regular basis. In fact, for
many products (e.g., cell phones, online gaming), the value of the product to a buyer depends on the
set of his friends that have already adopted the product. In this setting, the seller seeks for a marketing
strategy that guarantees a significant revenue through a wide adoption of the product, which leads to
an increased value, and consequently, to a profitable pricing of it.
A Model of Marketing Strategies for Social Networks. We adopt the model of Hartline, Mirrokni,
and Sundararajan [13], where a digital product is sold to a set of potential buyers under positive
externalities. As in [13], we assume an unlimited supply of the product and that there is no production
cost for it. A (possibly directed) social networkG on the set of potential buyers models how their value
of the product is affected by other buyers who already own the product. Namely, an edge e = (j, i) in
the social network denotes that the event that j owns the product has a positive influence on i’s value of
the product. The product’s value to each buyer i is given by a non-decreasing function vi(S) of the set
S of buyers who own the product and have positive influence on (equivalently, an edge to) i. The exact
values vi(S) are unknown and are treated as random variables of which only the distributions Fi,S are
known to the seller. The most interesting cases outlined in [13] are the Concave Graph Model, where
each vi(S) is a submodular function of S, and the Uniform Additive Model, where a non-negative
weight wji is associated with each edge (j, i), and vi(S) is uniformly distributed between 0 and the
total weight of the edges from S to i. An important special case of the Uniform Additive Model is the
undirected (or the symmetric) case, where the network G is undirected and wij = wji for all edges
{i, j}.
In this setting, the seller approaches each potential buyer once and makes an individualized offer
to him. A marketing strategy determines the sequence in which the seller approaches the buyers, and
the price offered to each buyer. Each buyer either accepts the offer, in which case he pays the price
asked by the seller, or rejects it, in which case he pays nothing and never receives an offer again. The
seller’s goal is to compute a marketing strategy that maximizes his revenue, namely the total amount
paid by the buyers accepting the offer.
Using a transformation from Maximum Acyclic Subgraph, Hartline et al. [13] proved that if the
seller has complete knowledge of the buyers’ valuations, computing a revenue-maximizing ordering
of the buyers isNP-hard for directed social networks. Combined with the result of [11], this transfor-
mation suggests an upper bound of 0.5 on the approximability of revenue maximization for directed
networks and deterministic additive valuations. On the positive side, Hartline et al. gave a polynomial-
time dynamic programming algorithm for a special fully symmetric case, where the order in which
the seller approaches the buyers is insignificant.
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An interesting contribution of [13] is a class of elegant marketing strategies called Influence-and-
Exploit. An Influence-and-Exploit (IE) strategy first offers the product for free to a selected subset of
buyers, aiming to increase the value of the product to the remaining buyers (influence step). Then, in
the exploit step, it approaches the remaining buyers, in a random order, and offers them the product at
the so-called myopic price. The myopic price ignores the current buyer’s influence on the subsequent
buyers and maximizes the expected revenue extracted from him. In the Uniform Additive Model, the
myopic price is accepted by each buyer with probability 1/2. Hence, there is a notion of uniformity
in the prices offered in the exploit step, in the sense that each buyer accepts the offer with a fixed
probability, and we can say that the IE strategy uses a pricing probability of 1/2.
To demonstrate the efficiency of IE strategies, Hartline et al. [13] proved that the best IE strategy
approximates the maximum revenue within a factor of 0.25 for the Concave Graph Model, and within
a factor of 0.94 for the (polynomially solvable) fully symmetric case of the Uniform Additive Model.
Furthermore, they proved that if each buyer is selected in the influence set randomly, with an appro-
priate probability, the expected revenue of IE is at least 2/3 (resp. 1/3) times the maximum revenue of
undirected (resp. directed) social networks. For the Concave Graph Model, Hartline et al. presented a
polynomial-time local search algorithm which approximates the revenue of the best IE strategy within
a factor of 0.4. Since [13], the Influence-and-Exploit paradigm has been applied to a few other settings
involving revenue maximization under positive externalities (see e.g. [4, 5, 12]).
Contribution and Techniques. Despite the fact that IE strategies are simple, elegant, and quite
promising in terms of efficiency, their performance against the maximum revenue and their polynomial-
time approximability are hardly well understood. In this work, we restrict our attention to the impor-
tant case of the Uniform Additive Model, and obtain a comprehensive collection of results on the
efficiency and the approximability of IE strategies. Our results also imply a significant improvement
on the best known approximation ratio for revenue maximization in the Uniform Additive Model.
We first show that in the Uniform Additive Model, both computing the optimal marketing strategy
and computing the best IE strategy areNP-hard for undirected social networks1. Next, we embark on
a systematic study of the algorithmic properties of IE strategies (cf. Section 3). In [13], IE strategies
are restricted, by definition, to the myopic pricing probability, which for the Uniform Additive Model
is 1/2. A bit surprisingly, we observe that we can achieve a measurable improvement on the efficiency
of IE strategies if we use smaller prices (equivalently, a larger pricing probability) in the exploit step.
Thus, we let IE strategies use a carefully selected pricing probability p ∈ [1/2, 1).
We show the existence of an IE strategy with pricing probability 0.586 (resp. 2/3) which approx-
imates the maximum revenue within a factor of 0.9111 for undirected (resp. 0.55289 for directed)
networks. The proof assumes a revenue-maximizing pricing probability vector p and constructs an
IE strategy with the desired expected revenue by applying randomized rounding to p. An interesting
consequence is that the upper bound of 0.5 on the approxibability of the maximum revenue of directed
networks does not apply to the Uniform Additive Model. In Section 3, we discuss the technical rea-
sons behind this and show a pair of upper bounds on the approximability of the maximum revenue of
directed social networks in the Uniform Additive Model. Specifically, assuming the Unique Games
conjecture, we show that it isNP-hard to approximate the maximum revenue within a factor greater
than 27/32, and greater than 3/4, if we use an IE strategy with pricing probability 2/3.
The technical intuition behind most of our results comes from the apparent connection between
good IE strategies and large cuts in the underlying social network. Following this intuition, we opti-
1 We should highlight that if the seller has complete knowledge of the buyers’ valuations, finding a revenue-maximizing
buyer ordering for undirected social networks is polynomially solvable (cf. Lemma 1). Therefore, the reduction of [13]
does not imply theNP-hardness of revenue maximization for undirected networks.
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mize the parameters of the IE strategy of [13] and slightly improve the approximation ratio to 0.686
(resp. 0.343) for undirected (resp. directed) social networks. Moreover, we show that for undirected
bipartite social networks, an IE strategy extracts the maximum revenue and can be computed in poly-
nomial time. Building on the idea of generating revenue from large cuts in the network, we discuss, in
Section 5, a natural generalization of IE strategies that use more than two pricing classes. We show that
these strategies approximate the maximum revenue within a factor of 0.7032 for undirected networks
and of 0.3516 for directed networks.
The main hurdle in obtaining better approximation guarantees for the maximum revenue prob-
lem is the lack of any strong upper bounds on it. In Section 6, we obtain a strong Semidefinite
Programming (SDP) relaxation for the problem of computing the best IE strategy with any given
pricing probability. Our approach exploits the resemblance between computing the best IE strategy
and the problems of MAX-CUT and MAX-DICUT, and builds on the elegant approach of Goemans
and Williamson [10] and Feige and Goemans [8]. Solving the SDP relaxation and using randomized
rounding, we obtain a 0.9032 (resp. 0.9064) approximation for the best IE strategy with a pricing
probability of 0.586 for undirected networks (resp. of 2/3 for directed networks). Combining these
results with the bounds on the fraction of the maximum revenue extracted by the best IE strategy, we
significantly improve on the best known approximation ratio for revenue maximization to 0.8229 for
undirected networks and 0.5011 for directed networks (from 2/3 and 1/3, respectively, in [13]).
Other Related Work. Our work lies in the area of pricing and revenue maximization in the presence
of positive externalities, and more generally, in the wide area of social contagion. In this framework,
Domingos and Richardson [7] studied viral marketing and investigated how a small group of early
adopters can be selected, so that the spread of a product is maximized. Subsequently, Kempe, Klein-
berg and Tardos [14] considered this question from an algorithmic viewpoint, under the problem of
influence maximization, which has received considerable attention since then.
Hartline et al. [13] were the first to consider social influence in the framework of revenue maxi-
mization. Since then, relevant research has focused either on posted price strategies, where there is no
price discrimination, or on game theoretic considerations, where the buyers act strategically accord-
ing to their perceived value of the product. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that
considers the approximability of revenue maximization and of computing the best IE strategy, which
were the central problems studied in [13].
Regarding posted price strategies for revenue maximization, Arthur et al. [4] considered a model
where the seller cannot approach potential buyers. Instead, only recommendations about the prod-
uct cascade through the network from an initial seed of early adopters. They gave an Influence-
and-Exploit-based constant-factor approximation algorithm for the maximum revenue in this setting.
Akhlaghpour et al. [1] considered iterative posted price strategies where all interested buyers can buy
the product at the same price at a given time. They studied the revenue maximization problem under
two different repricing models, both allowing for at most k prices. If frequent repricing is allowed,
they proved that revenue maximization is NP-hard to approximate, and identified a special case of
the problem that can be approximated within reasonable factors. If repricing can be performed only
at a limited rate, they presented an FPTAS for revenue maximization. Anari et al. [3] considered a
posted price setting where the product exhibits historical externalities. Given a fixed price trajectory,
to which the seller commits himself, the buyers decide when to buy the product. In this setting, Anari
et al. studied existence and uniqueness of equilibria. They also presented an FPTAS for some special
cases of the problem of computing a price trajectory that maximizes the seller’s revenue.
In a complementary direction, Chen et al. [6] investigated the Nash equilibria and the Bayesian-
Nash equilibria when each buyer’s value of the product depends on the set of buyers who own the
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product. They focused on two classes of equilibria, pessimistic and optimistic ones, and showed how
to compute these equilibria and how to find revenue-maximizing prices. Candogan et al. [5] investi-
gated a scenario where a monopolist sells a divisible good to buyers under positive externalities. They
considered a two-stage game where the seller first sets an individual price for each buyer, and then
the buyers decide on their consumption level, according to a utility function of the consumption levels
of their neighbors. They proved that the optimal price for each buyer is proportional to his Bonacich
centrality, and that if the buyers are partitioned into two pricing classes (which is conceptually similar
to Influence-and-Exploit), the problem is reducible to MAX-CUT.
2 Model and Preliminaries
The Influence Model. The social network is a (possibly directed) weighted network G(V,E,w) on
the set V of potential buyers. There is a positive weight wij associated with each edge (i, j) ∈ E
(we assume that wij = 0 if (i, j) 6∈ E). A social network is undirected (or symmetric) if wij = wji
for all i, j ∈ V , and directed (or asymmetric) otherwise. There may exist a non-negative weight wii
associated with each buyer i 2. Every buyer has a value vi : 2Ni 7→ R+ of the product, which depends
onwii and on the set S ⊆ Ni of his neighbors who already own the product, whereNi = {j ∈ V \{i} :
(j, i) ∈ E}. We assume that the exact values of vi are unknown to the seller, and that for each buyer i
and each set S ⊆ Ni, the seller only knows the probability distribution Fi,S(x) = IPr[vi(S) < x] that
buyer i rejects an offer of price x for the product.
In this work, we focus on the Uniform Additive Model [13, Section 2.1], which can be regarded
as an extension of the Linear Threshold Model of social influence introduced in [14]. In the Uniform
Additive Model, the values vi(S) are drawn from the uniform distribution in [0,Mi,S ], where Mi,S =∑
j∈S∪{i}wji is the total influence perceived by i, given the set S of his neighbors who own the
product. Then, the probability that i rejects an offer of price x is Fi,S(x) = x/Mi,S .
Myopic Pricing. The myopic price disregards any externalities imposed by i on his neighbors, and
simply maximizes the expected revenue extracted from buyer i, given that S is the current set of i’s
neighbors who own the product. For the Uniform Additive Model, the myopic price is Mi,S/2, the
probability that buyer i accepts it is 1/2, and the expected revenue extracted from him with the myopic
price is Mi,S/4, which is the maximum revenue one can extract from buyer i alone.
Marketing Strategies and Revenue Maximization. We can usually extract more revenue from G by
employing a marketing strategy that exploits the positive influence between the buyers. A marketing
strategy (pi,x) consists of a permutation pi of the buyers and a pricing vector x = (x1, . . . , xn),
where pi determines the order in which the buyers are approached and x the prices offered to them.
We observe that for any buyer i and any probability p that i accepts an offer, there is an (essentially
unique) price xp such that i accepts an offer of xp with probability p. For the Uniform Additive Model,
xp = (1−p)Mi,S and the expected revenue extracted from buyer i with such an offer is p(1−p)Mi,S .
Throughout this paper, we equivalently regard marketing strategies as consisting of a permutation
pi of the buyers and a vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) of pricing probabilities. We note that if pi = 1, i
gets the product for free, while if pi = 1/2, the price offered to i is (the myopic price of) Mi,S/2.
We assume that pi ∈ [1/2, 1], since any expected revenue in [0,Mi,S/4] can be achieved with such
2 For simplicity, we ignore wii’s for directed social networks. This is without loss of generality, since we can replace each
wii by an edge (i′, i) of weight wii from a new node i′ with a single outgoing edge (i′, i) and no incoming edges.
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pricing probabilities. Then, the expected revenue of a marketing strategy (pi,p) is:
R(pi,p) =
∑
i∈V
pi(1− pi)
wii + ∑
j:pij<pii
pjwji
 (1)
The problem of revenue maximization under the Uniform Additive Model is to find a marketing strat-
egy (pi∗,p∗) that extracts a maximum revenue of R(pi∗,p∗) from a given social network G(V,E,w).
Bounds on the Maximum Revenue. LetN =
∑
i∈V wii andW =
∑
i<j wij , if the social networkG
is undirected, andW =
∑
(i,j)∈E wij , ifG is directed. Then an upper bound on the maximum revenue
of G is R∗ = (W +N)/4, and follows by summing up the myopic revenue over all edges of G [13,
Fact 1]. For a lower bound on the maximum revenue, if G is undirected (resp. directed), approaching
the buyers in any order (resp. in a random order) and offering them the myopic price yields a revenue
of (W + 2N)/8 (resp. (W + 4N)/16). Thus, myopic pricing achieves an approximation ratio of 0.5
for undirected networks and of 0.25 for directed networks.
Ordering and NP-Hardness. Revenue maximization exhibits a dual nature involving optimizing
both the pricing probabilities and the sequence of offers. For directed networks, finding a good order-
ing pi of the buyers bears a resemblance to the Maximum Acyclic Subgraph problem, where given a
directed network G(V,E,w), we seek for an acyclic subgraph of maximum total edge weight. In fact,
any permutation pi of V corresponds to an acyclic subgraph ofG that includes all edges going forward
in pi, i.e, all edges (i, j) with pii < pij . [13, Lemma 3.2] shows that given a directed network G and
a pricing probability vector p, computing an optimal ordering of the buyers (for the particular p) is
equivalent to computing a Maximum Acyclic Subgraph of G, with each edge (i, j) having a weight
of pipj(1− pj)wij . Consequently, computing an ordering pi that maximizes R(pi,p) isNP-hard and
Unique-Games-hard to approximate within a factor greater than 0.5 [11].
On the other hand, we show that in the undirected case, if the pricing probabilities are given, we
can easily compute the best ordering of the buyers (see also Section A.1, in the Appendix, for a simple
example about the importance of a good ordering in the undirected case).
Lemma 1. Let G(V,E,w) be an undirected social network, and let p be any pricing probability
vector. Then, approaching the buyers in non-increasing order of their pricing probabilities maximizes
the revenue extracted from G under p.
Proof. We consider an optimal ordering pi (wrt. p) that minimizes the number of buyers’ pairs appear-
ing in increasing order of their pricing probabilities, namely, the number of pairs i1, i2 with pi1 < pi2
and pii1 < pii2 . If there is such a pair in pi, we can find a pair of buyers i and j with pi < pj such that i
appears just before j in pi. Then, switching the positions of i and j in pi changes the expected revenue
extracted from G under p by pipjwij(pj − pi) ≥ 0, a contradiction. uunionsq
A consequence of Lemma 1 is that [13, Lemma 3.2] does not imply theNP-hardness of revenue
maximization for undirected social networks. The following lemma employs a reduction from mono-
tone One-in-Three 3-SAT, and shows that revenue maximization isNP-hard for undirected networks.
Lemma 2. The problem of computing a marketing strategy that extracts the maximum revenue from
an undirected social network isNP-hard.
Proof. In monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT, we are given a set V of n items and m subsets T1, . . . , Tm
of V , with 2 ≤ |Tj | ≤ 3 for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We ask for a subset S ⊂ V such that |S∩Tj | = 1 for
all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT is shownNP-complete in [15]. In the following,
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Fig. 1. Examples of (a) an extended triangle and (b) a 3-path, used in the proof of Lemma 2. We create an extended triangle
for each 3-item set Tj and a 3-path for each 2-item set Tj . The set nodes are different for each set Tj , while the selection
nodes are common for all sets.
we letm2 (resp.m3) denote the number of 2-item (resp. 3-item) sets Tj in an instance (V, T1, . . . , Tm)
of monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT.
Given (V, T1, . . . , Tm), we construct an undirected social network G. The network G contains a
selection-node corresponding to each item in V . There are no edges between the selection nodes ofG.
For each 3-item set Tj = {a, b, c}, we create an extended triangle consisting of a triangle on three set
nodes aj , bj , and cj , and three additional edges that connect aj , bj , cj to the corresponding selection
nodes a, b, and c (see also Fig. 1.a). For each 2-item set Tj = {a, b}, we create a 3-path consisting
of an edge connecting two set nodes aj and bj , and two additional edges connecting aj and bj to the
corresponding selection nodes a and b (see also Fig. 1.b). Therefore,G contains n+2m2+3m3 nodes
and 3m2+6m3 edges. The weight of all edges of G is 1. We next show that (V, T1, . . . , Tm) is a YES-
instance of monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT iff the maximum revenue of G is at least 177128 m3 +
3
4 m2.
By Lemma 1, the revenue extracted from G is maximized if the nodes are approached in non-
increasing order of their pricing probabilities. Therefore, we can ignore the ordering of the nodes, and
focus on their pricing probabilities. The important property is that if each extended triangle (Fig. 1.a)
is considered alone, its maximum revenue is 177/128, and is obtained when exactly one of the selec-
tion nodes a, b, c has a pricing probability of 1/2 and the other two have a pricing probability of 1.
More specifically, since the selection nodes a, b, c have degree 1, the revenue of the extended triangle
is maximized when they have a pricing probability of either 1 or 1/2. If all a, b, c have a pricing prob-
ability of 1, the best revenue of the extended triangle is ≈ 1.196435, and is obtained when one of aj ,
bj , and cj has a pricing probability of ≈ 0.7474, the other has a pricing probability of ≈ 0.5715, and
the third has a pricing probability of 1/2. If all a, b, c have a pricing probability of 1/2, the best rev-
enue of the extended triangle is again≈ 1.196435, and is obtained with the same pricing probabilities
of aj , bj , and cj . If two of a, b, c (say a and b) have a pricing probability of 1/2 and c has a pricing
probability of 1, the best revenue of the extended triangle is 2116 = 1.3125, and is obtained when one
of aj and bj has a pricing probability of 1, the other has a pricing probability of 3/4, and cj has a
pricing probability of 1/2. Finally, if two of a, b, c (say b and c) have a pricing probability of 1 and a
has a pricing probability of 1/2, we extract a maximum revenue from the extended triangle, which is
177
128 = 1.3828125 and is obtained when aj has a pricing probability of 1, one of bj and cj has a pricing
probability of 9/16, and the other has a pricing probability of 1/2.
Similarly, if each 3-path (Fig. 1.b) is considered alone, its maximum revenue is 3/4, and is ob-
tained when exactly one of the selection nodes a, b has a pricing probability of 1/2 and the other
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has a pricing probability of 1. In fact, since the 3-path is a bipartite graph, Proposition 3 implies that
the maximum revenue, which is 3/4, is extracted when aj and b have a pricing probability of 1 and
bj and a have a pricing probability of 1/2 (or the other way around). If both a and b have a pricing
probability of 1, the best revenue of the 3-path is 41/64 and is obtained when one of aj and bj has a
pricing probability of 5/8, and the other has a pricing probability of 1/2. If both a and b have a pricing
probability of 1/2, the best revenue of 3-path is again 41/64 and is obtained when one of aj and bj
has a pricing probability of 1, and the other has a pricing probability of 5/8.
If (V, T1, . . . , Tm) is a YES-instance of monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT, we assign a pricing prob-
ability of 1/2 to the selection nodes in S and a pricing probability of 1 to the selection nodes in V \S,
where S is a set with exactly one element of each Tj . Thus, we have exactly one selection node with
pricing probability 1/2 in each extended triangle and in each 3-path. Then, we can set the pricing
probabilities of the set nodes as above, so that the revenue of each extended triangle is 177/128 and
the revenue of each 3-path is 3/4. Thus, the maximum revenue of G is at least 177128 m3 +
3
4 m2.
For the converse, we recall that the edges of G can be partitioned into m3 extended triangles and
m2 3-paths. Consequently, if the maximum revenue of G is at least 177128 m3 +
3
4 m2, each extended
triangle contributes exactly 177/128 and each 3-path contributes exactly 3/4 to the revenue of G.
Thus, by the analysis on their revenue above, each extended triangle and each 3-path includes exactly
one selection node with a pricing probability of 1/2. Therefore, if we let S consist of the selection
nodes with pricing probability 1/2, we have that |S ∩ Tj | = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. uunionsq
3 Influence-and-Exploit Strategies
An Influence-and-Exploit (IE) strategy IE(A, p) consists of a set of buyers A receiving the product
for free and a pricing probability p offered to the remaining buyers in V \ A, who are approached
in a random order. We slightly abuse the notation and let IE(q, p) denote an IE strategy where each
buyer is selected inA independently with probability q. IE(A, p) extracts an expected (wrt the random
ordering of the exploit set) revenue of:
RIE(A, p) = p(1− p)
∑
i∈V \A
wii +∑
j∈A
wji +
∑
j∈V \A, j 6=i
pwji
2
 (2)
Specifically, IE(A, p) extracts a revenue of p(1 − p)wji from each edge (j, i) with buyer j in the
influence set A and buyer i in the exploit set V \A. Moreover, IE(A, p) extracts a revenue of p2(1−
p)wji from each edge (j, i) with both j, i in the exploit set, if j appears before i in the random order
of V \A, which happens with probability 1/2.
The problem of finding the best IE strategy is to compute a subset of buyersA∗ and a pricing prob-
ability p∗ that extract a maximum revenue of RIE(A∗, p∗) from a given social network G(V,E,w).
The following lemma employs a reduction from monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT, and shows that com-
puting the best IE strategy isNP-hard.
Lemma 3. Let p ∈ [1/2, 1) be any fixed pricing probability. The problem of finding the best IE
strategy with pricing probability p isNP-hard, even for undirected social networks.
Proof. We recall that in monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT, we are given a set V of n items andm subsets
T1, . . . , Tm of V , with 2 ≤ |Tj | ≤ 3 for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We ask for a subset S ⊂ V such that
|S ∩ Tj | = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
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Given (V, T1, . . . , Tm), we construct an undirected social network G on V . For each 3-item set
Tj = {a, b, c}, we create a set-triangle on nodes a, b, and c with 3 edges of weight 1. For each 2-
item set Tj = {a, b}, we add a set-edge {a, b} of weight 2 + p, where p is the pricing probability.
To avoid multiple appearances of the same edge, we let the weight of each edge be the total weight
of its appearances. Namely, if an edge e appears in k3 set-triangles and in k2 set-edges, e’s weight
is k3 + (2 + p)k2. We observe that for any p ∈ [1/2, 1), the maximum revenue extracted from any
set-triangle and any set-edge is p(1 − p)(2 + p), by giving the product for free to exactly one of the
nodes of the set-triangle (resp. the set-edge).
We next show that (V, T1, . . . , Tm) is a YES-instance of monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT iff there is
an influence set A in G such that RIE(A, p) ≥ mp(1− p)(2+ p). If (V, T1, . . . , Tm) is a YES-instance
of monotone One-in-Three 3-SAT, we let the influence set A = S, where S is a set with exactly one
element of each Tj . Then, we extract an expected revenue of p(1−p)(2+p) from each set-triangle and
each set-edge in G, which yields an expected revenue of mp(1− p)(2 + p) in total. For the converse,
if there is an influence set A in G such that RIE(A, p) ≥ mp(1 − p)(2 + p), we let S = A. Since
RIE(A, p) ≥ mp(1− p)(2 + p), and since the edges of G can be partitioned into m set-triangles and
set-edges, each with a maximum revenue of at most p(1 − p)(2 + p), each set-triangle and each set-
edge contributes exactly p(1−p)(2+p) toRIE(A, p). Therefore, for all set-triangles and all set-edges,
there is exactly one node in A. Thus, we have that |S ∩ Tj | = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. uunionsq
Interestingly, even very simple IE strategies extract a significant fraction of the maximum revenue.
For example, for undirected social networks, RIE(∅, 2/3) = (4W + 6N)/27, and thus IE(∅, 2/3)
achieves an approximation ratio of 1627 ≈ 0.592. For directed networks,RIE(∅, 2/3) = (2W+6N)/27,
and thus IE(∅, 2/3) achieves an approximation ratio of 827 ≈ 0.296. In the following, we show that
carefully selected IE strategies manage to extract a larger fraction of the maximum revenue.
Exploiting Large Cuts. A natural idea is to exploit the apparent connection between a large cut in the
social network and a good IE strategy. For example, in the undirected case, an IE strategy IE(q, p) is
conceptually similar to the randomized 0.5-approximation algorithm for MAX-CUT, which puts each
node in set A with probability 1/2. However, in addition to a revenue of p(1− p)wij from each edge
{i, j} in the cut (A, V \A), IE(q, p) extracts a revenue of p2(1−p)wij from each edge {i, j} between
nodes in the exploit set V \A. Thus, to optimize the performance of IE(q, p), we carefully adjust the
probabilities q and p so that IE(q, p) balances between the two sources of revenue. Hence, we obtain
the following:
Proposition 1. Let G(V,E,w) be an undirected social network, and let q = max{1 −
√
2(2+λ)
4 , 0},
where λ = N/W . Then, IE(q, 2−√2) approximates the maximum revenue extracted from G within
a factor of at least 2
√
2(2−√2)(√2− 1) ≈ 0.686.
Proof. The proof extends the proof of [13, Theorem 3.1]. We start with calculating the expected (wrt
to the random choice of the influence set) revenue of IE(q, p). The expected revenue of IE(q, p) from
each loop {i, i} is (1− q)p(1− p)wii. In particular, a revenue of p(1− p)wii is extracted from {i, i}
if buyer i is included in the exploit set, which happens with probability 1 − q. The expected revenue
of IE(q, p) from each edge {i, j}, i < j, is (2q(1 − q)p(1 − p) + (1 − q)2p2(1 − p))wij . More
specifically, if one of i, j is included in the influence set and the other is included in the exploit set,
which happens with probability 2q(1 − q), a revenue of p(1 − p)wij is extracted from edge {i, j}.
Otherwise, if both i and j are included in the exploit set, which happens with probability (1 − q)2, a
revenue of p2(1− p)wij is extracted from edge {i, j} (note that since {i, j} is an undirected edge, the
order in which i and j are considered in the exploit set is insignificant). By linearity of expectation,
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the expected revenue of IE(q, p) is:
RIE(q, p) = (1− q)p(1− p)
∑
i∈V
wii + (1− q)p(1− p)
∑
i<j
(2q + p(1− q))wij
Using that N =
∑
i∈V wii and W =
∑
i<j wij , and setting N = λW , we obtain that:
RIE(q, p) = (1− q)p(1− p)(λ+ 2q + p(1− q))W
Differentiating with respect to q, we obtain that the optimal value of q is
q∗ = max
{
1− p− λ/2
2− p , 0
}
We recall that R∗ = (1 + λ)W/4 is an upper bound on the maximum revenue of G. Therefore, the
approximation ratio of IE(q, p) is:
4(1− q)p(1− p)(λ+ 2q + p(1− q))
1 + λ
(3)
Using p = 1/2 and q = max
{
1−λ
3 , 0
}
in (3), we obtain the IE strategy of [13, Theorem 3.1], whose
approximation ratio is at least 2/3, attained at λ = 0. Assuming small values of λ, so that q∗ > 0,
and differentiating with respect to p, we obtain that the best value of p for IE(q∗, p) is p∗ = 2−√2.
Using p = 2−√2 and q = max
{
1−
√
2(2+λ)
4 , 0
}
, we obtain an IE strategy with an approximation
ratio of at least 2
√
2(2−√2)(√2− 1) ≈ 0.686, attained at λ = 0. uunionsq
Proposition 2. Let G(V,E,w) be a directed social network. Then, IE
(
1−
√
2
2 , 2−
√
2
)
approxi-
mates the maximum revenue of G within a factor of
√
2(2−√2)(√2− 1) ≈ 0.343.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. We recall that for the directed case, we can
ignore loops (i, i). Since the social network G is directed, the expected (wrt to the random choice of
the influence set and the random order of the exploit set) revenue of IE(q, p) is:
RIE(q, p) = (1− q)p(1− p)
∑
(i,j)∈E
(q + p(1− q)/2)wij
= (1− q)p(1− p)(q + p(1− q)/2)W
More specifically, if i is included in the influence set and j is included in the exploit set, which happens
with probability q(1− q), a revenue of p(1− p)wij is extracted from each edge (i, j). Furthermore, if
both i and j are included in the exploit set V \A and i appears before j in the random order of V \A,
which happens with probability (1− q)2/2, a revenue of p2(1− p)wij is extracted from edge (i, j).
Using the upper bound of W/4 on the maximum revenue of G, we have that the approximation
ratio of IE(q, p) is at least 4(1 − q)p(1 − p)(q + p(1 − q)/2). Setting q = 1/3 and p = 1/2,
we obtain the IE strategy of [13, Theorem 3.1], whose approximation ratio for directed networks is
1/3. Using q = 1 −
√
2
2 and p = 2 −
√
2, we obtain an IE strategy with an approximation ratio of√
2(2−√2)(√2− 1) ≈ 0.343. uunionsq
Proposition 3 (Optimality of IE for Bipartite Networks). Let G(V,E,w) be an undirected bipar-
tite social network with wii = 0 for all buyers i, and let (A, V \ A) be any partition of V into
independent sets. Then, IE(A, 1/2) extracts the maximum revenue of G.
Proof. Since all edges of G are between buyers in the influence set A and buyers in the exploit set
V \ A, IE(A, 1/2) extracts the myopic revenue of wij/4 from any edge {i, j} ∈ E. Therefore,
IE(A, 1/2) is an optimal strategy. uunionsq
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4 On the Efficiency of Influence-and-Exploit Strategies
Next, we show that the best IE strategy, which isNP-hard to compute, manages to extract a significant
fraction of the maximum revenue.
Theorem 1. For any undirected social network, there is an IE strategy with pricing probability 0.586
whose revenue is at least 0.9111 times the maximum revenue.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary undirected social network G(V,E,w), start from an arbitrary pricing
probability vector p, and obtain an IE strategy IE(A, pˆ) by applying randomized rounding to p. We
show that for pˆ = 0.586, the expected (wrt the randomized rounding choices) revenue of IE(A, pˆ) is
at least 0.9111 times the revenue extracted from G by the best ordering for p (recall that by Lemma 1,
the best ordering is to approach the buyers in non-increasing order of their pricing probabilities).
Without loss of generality, we assume that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn, and let pi be the identity
permutation. Then, R(pi,p) =
∑
i∈V pi(1− pi)wii +
∑
i<j pipj(1− pj)wij .
For the IE strategy, we assign each buyer i to the influence set A independently with probability
I(pi) = α(pi − 0.5), for some appropriate α ∈ [0, 2], and to the exploit set with probability E(pi) =
1− I(pi). By linearity of expectation, the expected revenue of IE(A, pˆ) is:
RIE(A, pˆ) =
∑
i∈V
pˆ(1− pˆ)E(pi)wii +
∑
i<j
pˆ(1− pˆ)(I(pi)E(pj) + E(pi)I(pj) + pˆ E(pi)E(pj))wij
Specifically, IE(A, pˆ) extracts a revenue of pˆ(1 − pˆ)wii from edge loop {i, i}, if i is included in the
exploit set. Moreover, IE(A, pˆ) extracts a revenue of pˆ(1− pˆ)wij from each edge {i, j}, i < j, if one
of i, j is included in the influence set A and the other is not, and a revenue of pˆ2(1 − pˆ)wij if both
i and j are included in the exploit set V \ A (note that the order in which i and j are considered is
insignificant).
The approximation ratio is derived as the minimum ratio between any pair of terms in R(pi,p)
and RIE(A, pˆ) corresponding to the same loop {i, i} or to the same edge {i, j}. For a weaker bound,
we observe that for α = 1.43 and pˆ = 0.586, both
min
0.5≤x≤1
pˆ (1− pˆ)E(x)
x (1− x) and min0.5≤y≤x≤1
pˆ (1− pˆ)(I(x)E(y) + E(x) I(y) + pˆ E(x)E(y))
x y (1− y) (4)
are at least 0.8024. More precisely, the former quantity is minimized for x ≈ 0.7104, for which it
becomes ≈ 0.8244. For any fixed value of y ∈ [0.5, 1.0], the latter quantity is minimized for x = 1.0.
The minimum value is 0.8024 for x = 1.0 and y ≈ 0.629.
For the stronger bound of 0.9111, we let pˆ = 0.586, and for each buyer i, let the rounding param-
eter α(pi) be chosen according to the following piecewise linear function of pi :
α(pi) =

5.0 (pi − 0.5) if 0.5 ≤ pi ≤ 0.7
1.0 + 3.3 (pi − 0.7) if 0.7 < pi ≤ 0.8
1.33 + 3.0 (pi − 0.8) if 0.8 < pi ≤ 0.9
1.63 + 3.7 (pi − 0.9) if 0.9 < pi ≤ 1.0
The quantity on the left of (4) is minimized for x = 0.8, for which it becomes ≈ 0.9112. For
any fixed x ∈ [0.5, 0.949], the quantity on the right of (4) is minimized for y = 0.5. The minimum
value is 0.9111 for x ≈ 0.7924 and y = 0.5. For any x ∈ (0.949, 0.983], the latter quantity is
minimized for y = 0.7. The minimum value, over all x ∈ (0.949, 0.983], is ≈ 0.93 at x = 0.983
and y = 0.7. For any fixed x ∈ (0.983, 1.0], the quantity on the right of (4) is minimized for some
y ∈ [0.7, 0.8]. Moreover, for all y ∈ [0.7, 0.8], this quantity is minimized for x = 1.0. The minimum
value is ≈ 0.9112 at x = 1.0 and y ≈ 0.8. uunionsq
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Theorem 2. For any directed social network, there is an IE strategy with pricing probability 2/3
whose expected revenue is at least 0.55289 times the maximum revenue.
Proof. As before, we consider an arbitrary directed social networkG(V,E,w), start from an arbitrary
pricing probability vector p, and obtain an IE strategy IE(A, pˆ) by applying randomized rounding to
p. We show that for pˆ = 2/3, the expected (wrt the randomized rounding choices) revenue of IE(A, pˆ)
is at least 0.55289 times the revenue extracted from G under the best ordering for p (which ordering
is Unique-Games-hard to approximate within a factor less than 0.5!).
We recall that in the directed case, we can, without loss of generality, ignore loops (i, i). Let pi be
the best ordering pi for p. Then, the maximum revenue extracted from G with pricing probabilities p
is R(pi,p) ≤∑(i,j)∈E pipj(1− pj)wij .
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we assign each buyer i to the influence set A independently with
probability I(pi) = α(pi − 0.5), for some α ∈ [0, 2], and to the exploit set with probability E(pi) =
1 − I(pi). By linearity of expectation, the expected (wrt the randomized rounding choices) revenue
extracted by IE(A, pˆ) is:
RIE(A, pˆ) =
∑
(i,j)∈E
pˆ(1− pˆ)(I(pi)E(pj) + 0.5 pˆ E(pi)E(pj))wij
Specifically, IE(A, pˆ) extracts a revenue of pˆ(1 − pˆ)wij from each edge (i, j), if i is included in the
influence set and j is included in the exploit set, and a revenue of pˆ2(1 − pˆ)wij if both i and j are
included in the exploit set V \A and i appears before j in the random order of V \A.
The approximation ratio is derived as the minimum ratio between any pair of terms in R(pi,p)
and RIE(A, pˆ) corresponding to the same edge (i, j). Thus, we select pˆ and α so that the following
quantity is maximized:
min
0.5≤x,y≤1
pˆ (1− pˆ)(I(x)E(y) + 0.5 pˆ E(x)E(y))
x y (1− y)
We observe that for pˆ = 2/3 and α = 1.0, this quantity is simplified to miny∈[0.5,1]
2(3−2y)
27y(1−y) . The
minimum value is ≈ 0.55289 at y = 3−
√
3
2 . uunionsq
Similarly, we can show that there is an IE strategy with pricing probability 1/2 whose revenue is
at least 0.8857 (resp. 0.4594) times the maximum revenue for undirected (resp. directed) networks.
4.1 On the Approximability of the Maximum Revenue for Directed Networks
The results of [13, Lemma 3.2] and [11] suggest that given a pricing probability vector p, it is Unique-
Games-hard to compute a vertex ordering pi of a directed network G for which the revenue of (pi,p)
is at least 0.5 times the maximum revenue of G under p. An interesting consequence of Theorem 2
is that this inapproximability bound of 0.5 does not apply to revenue maximization in the Uniform
Additive Model. In particular, given a pricing probability vector p, Theorem 2 constructs, in linear
time, an IE strategy with an expected revenue of at least 0.55289 times the maximum revenue of G
under p. This does not contradict the results of [13, 11], because the pricing probabilities of the IE
strategy are different from p. Moreover, in the Uniform Additive Model, different acyclic (sub)graphs
(equivalently, different vertex orderings) allow for a different fraction of their edge weight to be trans-
lated into revenue (for an example, see Section A.2, in the Appendix), while in the reduction of [13,
Lemma 3.2], the weight of each edge in an acyclic subgraph is equal to its revenue. Thus, although the
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IE strategy of Theorem 2 is 0.55289-approximate with respect to the maximum revenue ofG under p,
its vertex ordering combined with p may generate a revenue of less than 0.5 times the maximum rev-
enue of G under p. In fact, based on Theorem 2, we obtain, in Section 6, a polynomial-time algorithm
that approximates the maximum revenue of a directed network G within a factor of 0.5011.
The following propositions establish a pair of inapproximabity results for revenue maximization
in the Uniform Additive Model.
Proposition 4. Assuming the Unique Games conjecture, it is NP-hard to compute an IE strategy
with pricing probability 2/3 that approximates within a factor greater than 3/4 the maximum revenue
of a directed social network in the Uniform Additive Model.
Proof. Let G(V,E,w) be a directed social network, and let pi∗ be a vertex ordering corresponding
to an acyclic subgraph of G with a maximum edge weight of W ∗. Then, approaching the buyers
according to pi∗ and offering a pricing probability of 2/3 to each of them, we extract a revenue of
4W ∗/27. Therefore, the maximum revenue of G is at least 4W ∗/27.
Now, we assume an influence set A so that IE(A, 2/3) approximates the maximum revenue of
G within a factor of r. Thus, RIE(A, 2/3) ≥ 4rW ∗/27. Let pi be the order in which IE(A, 2/3) ap-
proaches the buyers, and let (i, j) be any edge with pii < pij , namely, any edge from which IE(A, 2/3)
extracts some revenue. Since the revenue extracted from each such edge (i, j) is at most 2wij/9, the
edge weight of the acyclic subgraph defined by pi is at least 92RIE(A, 2/3) ≥ 2r3 W ∗.
Hence, given an r-approximate IE(A, 2/3), we can approximate W ∗ within a ratio of 2r/3. The
proposition follows from [11, Theorem 1.1], which assumes the Unique Games conjecture and shows
that it isNP-hard to approximate W ∗ within a ratio greater than 1/2. uunionsq
Proposition 5. Assuming the Unique Games conjecture, it isNP-hard to approximate within a factor
greater than 27/32 the maximum revenue of a directed social network in the Uniform Additive Model.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. LetG(V,E,w) be a directed social network,
and let pi∗ be a vertex ordering corresponding to an acyclic subgraph of G with a maximum edge
weight of W ∗. Using pi∗ and a pricing probability of 2/3 for all buyers, we obtain that the maximum
revenue of G is at least 4W ∗/27.
We assume a marketing strategy (pi,p) that approximates the maximum revenue of G within a
factor of r. Thus, R(pi,p) ≥ 4rW ∗/27. Let (i, j) be any edge with pii < pij , namely, any edge from
which (pi,p) extracts some revenue. Since the revenue extracted from each such edge (i, j) is at most
wij/4, the edge weight of the acyclic subgraph defined by pi is at least 4R(pi,p) ≥ 16r27 W ∗
Thus, given an r-approximate marketing strategy (pi,p), we can approximate W ∗ within a ratio
of 16r/27. Now, the proposition follows from [11, Theorem 1.1]. uunionsq
5 Generalized Influence-and-Exploit
Building on the idea of generating revenue from large cuts between different pricing classes, we obtain
a class of generalized IE strategies, which employ a refined partition of buyers in more than two pricing
classes. We first analyze the efficiency of generalized IE strategies for undirected networks, and then
translate our results to the directed case. The analysis generalizes the proof of Proposition 1.
A generalized IE strategy consists of K pricing classes, for some appropriately large integer K ≥
2. Each class k, k = 1, . . . ,K, is associated with a pricing probability of pk = 1 − k−12(K−1) . Each
buyer is assigned to the pricing class k independently with probability qk, where
∑K
k=1 qk = 1,
and is offered a pricing probability of pk. The buyers are considered in non-increasing order of their
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pricing probabilities, i.e., the buyers in class k are considered before the buyers in class k + 1, k =
1, . . . ,K − 1. The buyers in the same class are considered in random order. In the following, we let
IE(q,p) denote such a generalized IE strategy, where q = (q1, . . . , qK) is the assignment probability
vector and p = (p1, . . . , pK) is the pricing probability vector.
We proceed to calculate the expected revenue extracted by the generalized IE strategy IE(q,p)
from an undirected social network G(V,E,w). The expected revenue of IE(q,p) from each loop
{i, i} is wii
∑K
k=1 qkpk(1 − pk). Specifically, for each k, buyer i is included in the pricing class k
with probability qk, in which case, the revenue extracted from {i, i} is pk(1 − pk)wii. The expected
revenue of IE(p, q) from each edge {i, j}, i < j, is:
wij
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk)
(
qkpk + 2
k−1∑
`=1
q`p`
)
More specifically, for each class k, if both i, j are included in the pricing class k, which happens with
probability q2k, the revenue extracted from {i, j} is p2k(1 − pk)wij . Furthermore, for each pair `, k of
pricing classes, 1 ≤ ` < k ≤ K, if either i is included in ` and j is included in k or the other way
around, which happens with probability 2q`qk, the revenue extracted from {i, j} is p`pk(1 − pk)wij .
Using linearity of expectation and setting N =
∑
i∈V wii and W =
∑
i<j wij , we obtain that the
expected revenue of IE(q,p) is:
RIE(q,p) = N
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk) +W
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk)
(
qkpk + 2
k−1∑
`=1
q`p`
)
Since R∗ = (N +W )/4 is an upper bound on the maximum revenue of G, the approximation ratio
of IE(q,p) is at least:
min
{
4
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk), 4
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk)
(
qkpk + 2
k−1∑
`=1
q`p`
)}
(5)
We can now select the assignment probability vector q so that (5) is maximized. We note that with
the pricing probability vector p fixed, this involves maximizing a quadratic function of q over linear
constraints. Thus, we obtain the following:
Theorem 3. For any undirected social network G, the generalized IE strategy with K = 6 pricing
classes and assignment probabilities q = (0.183, 0.075, 0.075, 0.175, 0.261, 0.231) approximates the
maximum revenue of G within a factor of 0.7032.
We note that the approximation ratio can be improved to 0.706 by considering more pricing
classes. By the same approach, we show that for directed social networks, the approximation ratio
of IE(q,p) is at least half the quantity in (5). Therefore:
Corollary 1. For any directed social network G, the generalized IE strategy with K = 6 pricing
classes and assignment probabilities q = (0.183, 0.075, 0.075, 0.175, 0.261, 0.231) approximates the
maximum revenue of G within a factor of 0.3516.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we calculate the expected (wrt the random partition of
buyers into pricing classes and the random order of buyers in the pricing classes) revenue extracted
by the generalized IE strategy IE(p, q) from a directed social network G(V,E,w). We recall that for
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directed social networks, we can ignore loops (i, i). The expected revenue of IE(p, q) from each edge
(i, j) is:
wij
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk)
(
qkpk
2
+
k−1∑
`=1
q`p`
)
More specifically, for each class k, if both i, j are included in the pricing class k and i appears
before j in the random order of the buyers in k, which happens with probability q2k/2, the revenue
extracted from each edge (i, j) is p2k(1 − pk)wij . Furthermore, for each pair `, k of pricing classes,
1 ≤ ` < k ≤ K, if i is included in ` and j is included in k, which happens with probability q`qk, the
revenue extracted from (i, j) is p`pk(1− pk)wij .
Using linearity of expectation and settingW =
∑
(i,j)∈E wij , we obtain that the expected revenue
of IE(q,p) is:
RIE(q,p) =W
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk)
(
qkpk
2
+
k−1∑
`=1
q`p`
)
Since W/4 is an upper bound on the maximum revenue of G, the approximation ratio of IE(q,p) is
at least:
4
K∑
k=1
qkpk(1− pk)
(
qkpk
2
+
k−1∑
`=1
q`p`
)
, (6)
namely at least half of the approximation ratio in the undirected case.
Using q = (0.183, 0.075, 0.075, 0.175, 0.261, 0.231) in (6), we obtain an approximation ratio of
at least 0.3516. uunionsq
6 Influence-and-Exploit via Semidefinite Programming
The main hurdle in obtaining better approximation guarantees for the maximum revenue problem
is the loose upper bound of (N +W )/4 on the optimal revenue. We do not know how to obtain a
stronger upper bound on the maximum revenue. However, in this section, we obtain a strong Semidef-
inite Programming (SDP) relaxation for the problem of computing the best IE strategy with any given
pricing probability p ∈ [1/2, 1). Our approach exploits the resemblance between computing the best
IE strategy and the problems of MAX-CUT (for undirected networks) and MAX-DICUT (for directed
networks), and builds on the elegant approach of Goemans and Williamson [10] and Feige and Goe-
mans [8]. Solving the SDP relaxation and using randomized rounding, we obtain, in polynomial time,
a good approximation to the best influence set for the given pricing probability p. Then, employing the
bounds of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we obtain strong approximation guarantees for the maximum
revenue problem for both directed and undirected networks.
Directed Social Networks. We start with the case of a directed social network G(V,E,w), which
is a bit simpler, because we can ignore loops (i, i) without loss of generality. We observe that for
any given pricing probability p ∈ [1/2, 1), the problem of computing the best IE strategy IE(A, p) is
equivalent to solving the following Quadratic Integer Program:
max p(1−p)4
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
1 + p2 + (1− p2)y0yi − (1 + p2)y0yj − (1− p2)yiyj
)
(Q1)
s.t. yi ∈ {−1, 1} ∀i ∈ V ∪ {0}
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In (Q1), there is a variable yi for each buyer i and an additional variable y0 denoting the influence set.
A buyer i is assigned to the influence set A, if yi = y0, and to the exploit set, otherwise. For each
edge (i, j), 1 + y0yi − y0yj − yiyj is 4, if yi = y0 = −yj (i.e., if i is assigned to the influence set
and j is assigned to the exploit set), and 0, otherwise. Moreover, p2(1 − y0yi − y0yj + yiyj) is 2p, if
yi = yj = −y0 (i.e., if both i and j are assigned to the exploit set), and 0, otherwise. Therefore, the
contribution of each edge (i, j) to the objective function of (Q1) is equal to the revenue extracted from
(i, j) by IE(A, p).
Following the approach of [10, 8], we relax (Q1) to the following Semidefinite Program, where
vi · vj denotes the inner product of vectors vi and vj :
max p(1−p)4
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
1 + p2 + (1− p2) v0 · vi − (1 + p2) v0 · vj − (1− p2) vi · vj
)
(S1)
s.t. vi · vj + v0 · vi + v0 · vj ≥ −1
vi · vj − v0 · vi − v0 · vj ≥ −1
−vi · vj − v0 · vi + v0 · vj ≥ −1
−vi · vj + v0 · vi − v0 · vj ≥ −1
vi · vi = 1, vi ∈ Rn+1 ∀i ∈ V ∪ {0}
We observe that any feasible solution to (Q1) can be translated into a feasible solution to (S1) by
setting vi = v0, if yi = y0, and vi = −v0, otherwise. An optimal solution to (S1) can be computed
within any precision ε in time polynomial in n and in ln 1ε (see e.g. [2]).
Given a directed social network G(V,E,w), a pricing probability p, and a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1],
the algorithm SDP-IE(p, γ) first computes an optimal solution v0, v1, . . . , vn to (S1). Then, following
[8], the algorithm maps each vector vi to a rotated vector v′i which is coplanar with v0 and vi, lies on
the same side of v0 as vi, and forms an angle with v0 equal to
fγ(θi) = (1− γ)θi + γpi(1− cos θi)/2 ,
where pi = 3.14 . . . and θi = arccos(v0 · vi) is the angle of v0 and vi. Finally, the algorithm computes
a random vector r uniformly distributed on the unit (n + 1)-sphere, and assigns each buyer i to the
influence setA, if sgn(v′i ·r) = sgn(v0 ·r), and to the exploit set V \A, otherwise3, where sgn(x) = 1,
if x ≥ 0, and −1, otherwise. We next show that:
Theorem 4. For any directed social networkG, SDP-IE(2/3, 0.722) approximates the maximum rev-
enue extracted from G by the best IE strategy with pricing probability 2/3 within a factor of 0.9064.
Proof. In the following, we let v0, v1, . . . , vn be an optimal solution to (S1), let θij = arccos(vi · vj)
be the angle of any two vectors vi and vj , and let θi = arccos(v0 · vi) be the angle of v0 and any
vector vi. Similarly, we let θ′ij = arccos(v
′
i · v′j) be the angle of any two rotated vectors v′i and v′j , and
let θ′i = arccos(v0 · v′i) be the angle of v0 and any rotated vector v′i. We first calculate the expected
revenue extracted from each edge (i, j) ∈ E by the IE strategy of SDP-IE(p, γ).
Lemma 4. The IE strategy of SDP-IE(p, γ) extracts from each edge (i, j) an expected revenue of:
wij p(1− p)
(1− p2) θ′ij − (1− p2) θ′i + (1 + p2) θ′j
2pi
(7)
3 Let θ′i = arccos(v0 · v′i) be the angle of v0 and a rotated vector v′i. To provide some intuition behind the rotation step,
we note that θ′i < θi, if θi ∈ (0, pi/2), and θ′i > θi, if θi ∈ (pi/2, pi). Therefore, applying rotation to vi, the algorithm
increases the probability of assigning i to the influence set, if θi ∈ (0, pi/2), and the probability of assigning i to the
exploit set, if θi ∈ (pi/2, pi). The strength of the rotation’s effect depends on the value of γ and on the value of θi.
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Proof. We first define the following mutually disjoint events:
Bij : sgn(v′i · r) = sgn(v′j · r) = sgn(v0 · r)
Bij : sgn(v
′
i · r) = sgn(v0 · r) 6= sgn(v′j · r)
Bji : sgn(v
′
j · r) = sgn(v0 · r) 6= sgn(v′i · r)
Bij : sgn(v
′
i · r) = sgn(v′j · r) 6= sgn(v0 · r)
Namely, Bij (resp. Bij) is the event that both i and j are assigned to the influence set A (resp. to the
exploit set V \A), and Bij (resp. Bji ) is the event that i (resp. j) is assigned to the influence set A and
j (resp. i) is assigned to the exploit set V \A. Also, we let IPr[B] denote the probability of any event
B. Then, the expected revenue extracted from each edge (i, j) is:
wij p(1− p)
(
IPr[Bij ] +
p
2 IPr[Bij ]
)
(8)
To calculate IPr[Bij ] and IPr[Bij ], we use that if r is a vector uniformly distributed on the unit
sphere, for any vectors vi, vj on the unit sphere, IPr[sgn(vi·r) 6= sgn(vj ·r)] = θij/pi [10, Lemma 3.2].
For IPr[Bij ], we calculate the probability of the event B
i
j ∪Bji that i and j are in different sets, of the
event Bij ∪Bij that i is in the influence set, and of the event Bji ∪Bij that j is in the influence set.
IPr[Bij ] + IPr[B
j
i ] = IPr[B
i
j ∪Bji ] = IPr[sgn(v′i · r) 6= sgn(v′j · r)] = θ′ij/pi (9)
IPr[Bij ] + IPr[B
ij ] = IPr[Bij ∪Bij ]= IPr[sgn(v′i · r) = sgn(v0 · r)] = 1− θ′i/pi (10)
IPr[Bji ] + IPr[B
ij ] = IPr[Bji ∪Bij ]= IPr[sgn(v′j · r) = sgn(v0 · r)] = 1− θ′j/pi (11)
Subtracting (11) from (9) plus (10), we obtain that:
IPr[Bij ] =
1
2pi (θ
′
ij − θ′i + θ′j) (12)
For IPr[Bij ], we also need the probability of the event B
j
i ∪Bij that i is in the exploit set, and of
the event Bij ∪Bij that j is in the exploit set.
IPr[Bji ] + IPr[Bij ] = IPr[B
j
i ∪Bij ]= IPr[sgn(v′i · r) 6= sgn(v0 · r)] = θ′i/pi (13)
IPr[Bij ] + IPr[Bij ] = IPr[B
i
j ∪Bij ]= IPr[sgn(v′j · r) 6= sgn(v0 · r)] = θ′j/pi (14)
Subtracting (9) from (13) plus (14), we obtain that:
IPr[Bij ] =
1
2pi (−θ′ij + θ′i + θ′j) (15)
Substituting (12) and (15) in (8), we obtain (7), and conclude the proof of the lemma. uunionsq
Since (S1) is a relaxation of the problem of computing the best IE strategy with pricing probability
p, the revenue of an optimal IE(A, p) strategy is at most:
p(1−p)
4
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
1 + p2 + (1− p2) cos θi − (1 + p2) cos θj − (1− p2) cos θij
)
(16)
On the other hand, by Lemma 4 and linearity of expectation, the IE strategy of SDP-IE(p, γ) generates
an expected revenue of:
p(1−p)
2pi
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
(1− p2) θ′ij − (1− p2) θ′i + (1 + p2) θ′j
)
(17)
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We recall that for each i, θ′i = fγ(θi). Moreover, in [8, Section 4], it is shown that for each i, j,
θ′ij = gγ(θij , θi, θj) = arccos
(
cos fγ(θi) cos fγ(θj) +
cos θij − cos θi cos θj
sin θi sin θj
sin fγ(θi) sin fγ(θj)
)
The approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) is derived as the minimum ratio of any pair of terms in (17)
and (16) corresponding to the same edge (i, j). Thus, the approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) is:
ρ(p, γ) =
2
pi
min
0≤x,y,z≤pi
(1− p2) gγ(x, y, z)− (1− p2)fγ(y) + (1 + p2)fγ(z)
1 + p2 + (1− p2) cos y − (1 + p2) cos z − (1− p2) cosx
s.t. cosx+ cos y + cos z ≥ −1
cosx− cos y − cos z ≥ −1
− cosx− cos y + cos z ≥ −1
− cosx+ cos y − cos z ≥ −1
It can be shown numerically, that ρ(2/3, 0.722) ≥ 0.9064. uunionsq
Combining Theorem 4 and Theorem 2, we conclude that:
Theorem 5. For any directed social network G, the IE strategy computed by SDP-IE(2/3, 0.722)
approximates the maximum revenue of G within a factor of 0.5011.
Undirected Social Networks. We apply the same approach to an undirected networkG(V,E,w). For
any given pricing probability p ∈ [1/2, 1), the problem of computing the best IE strategy IE(A, p) for
G is equivalent to solving the following Quadratic Integer Program:
max p(1−p)2
∑
i∈V
wii (1− y0yi) + p(1−p)4
∑
i<j
wij (2 + p− py0yi − py0yj − (2− p)yiyj) (Q2)
s.t. yi ∈ {−1, 1} ∀i ∈ V ∪ {0}
In (Q2), there is a variable yi for each buyer i and an additional variable y0 denoting the influence set.
A buyer i is assigned to the influence set A, if yi = y0, and to the exploit set, otherwise. For each loop
{i, i}, 1 − y0yi is 2, if i is assigned to the exploit set, and 0, otherwise. For each edge {i, j}, i < j,
2−2yiyj is 4, if i and j are assigned to different sets, and 0, otherwise. Also, p(1−y0yi−y0yj+yiyj)
is 4p, if both i and j are assigned to the exploit set, and 0, otherwise. Therefore, the contribution of
each loop {i, i} and each edge {i, j}, i < j, to the objective function of (Q2) is equal to the revenue
extracted from them by IE(A, p). The next step is to relax (Q1) to the following Semidefinite Program:
max p(1−p)2
∑
i∈V
wii (1− v0 · vi) + p(1−p)4
∑
i<j
wij (2 + p− p v0 · vi − p v0 · vj − (2− p) vi · vj)
s.t. vi · vj + v0 · vi + v0 · vj ≥ −1 (S2)
vi · vj − v0 · vi − v0 · vj ≥ −1
−vi · vj − v0 · vi + v0 · vj ≥ −1
−vi · vj + v0 · vi − v0 · vj ≥ −1
vi · vi = 1, vi ∈ Rn+1 ∀i ∈ V ∪ {0}
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Fig. 2. The approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) for the revenue of the best IE strategy and for the maximum revenue, as a
function of the pricing probability p. The upper left plot shows the best choice of the rotation parameter γ, as a function of
p. The blue curve (with circles) shows the best choice of γ for directed social networks and the red curve (with squares) for
undirected networks. In both cases, the best choice of γ increases with p. The upper right plot shows the approximation ratio
of SDP-IE(p, γ) for the maximum revenue for directed (blue curve, with circles) and undirected (red curve, with squares)
networks. The lower plots show the approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) for directed (left plot) and undirected (right plot)
networks, as a function of p. In each plot, the upper curve (in black) shows the approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) for the
revenue of the best IE strategy, which increases slowly with p. The blue curve (that with circles) shows the guarantee of
Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 on the fraction of the maximum revenue extracted by the best IE strategy. The red curve (that
with squares) shows the approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) for the maximum revenue.
The algorithm is the same as the algorithm for directed networks. Specifically, given an undi-
rected social network G(V,E,w), a pricing probability p, and a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1], the algorithm
SDP-IE(p, γ) first computes an optimal solution v0, v1, . . . , vn to (S2). Then, it maps each vector vi
to a rotated vector v′i which is coplanar with v0 and vi, lies on the same side of v0 as vi, and forms an
angle fγ(θi) with v0, where θi = arccos(v0 · vi). Finally, the algorithm computes a random vector r
uniformly distributed on the unit (n + 1)-sphere, and assigns each buyer i to the influence set A, if
sgn(v′i · r) = sgn(v0 · r), and to the exploit set V \A, otherwise. We prove that:
Theorem 6. For any undirected network G, SDP-IE(0.586, 0.209) approximates the maximum rev-
enue extracted from G by the best IE strategy with pricing probability 0.586 within a factor of 0.9032.
Proof. We employ the same approach, techniques, and notation as in the proof of Theorem 4. The
expected revenue extracted from each loop {i, i} is wii p(1 − p) times the probability that i is in the
exploit set, which is equal to IPr[sgn(v′i ·r) 6= sgn(v0 ·r)] = θ′i/pi. Therefore, the algorithm extracts an
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expected revenue of wii p(1− p) θ′i/pi from each loop {i, i}. Next, we calculate the expected revenue
extracted from each (undirected) edge {i, j}, i < j, by the IE strategy of SDP-IE(p, γ).
Lemma 5. SDP-IE(p, γ) extracts from each edge {i, j}, i < j, an expected revenue of:
wij p(1− p)
(2− p) θ′ij + p θ′i + p θ′j
2pi
Proof. Let the events Bij , B
j
i , and Bij be defined as in the proof of Lemma 4. In particular, B
i
j ∪ Bji
is the event that i and j are in different sets, and Bij is the event that both i and j are in the exploit
set. Thus, the expected revenue extracted from edge {i, j} is:
wij p(1− p)
(
IPr[Bij ∪Bji ] + p IPr[Bij ]
)
(18)
In the proof of Lemma 4, in (9) and (15) respectively, we show that IPr[Bij ∪ Bji ] = θ′ij/pi, and that
IPr[Bij ] = (−θ′ij + θ′i + θ′j)/(2pi). Substituting these in (18), we obtain the lemma. uunionsq
Therefore, by linearity of expectation, the expected revenue of SDP-IE(p, γ) is:
p(1−p)
pi
∑
i∈V
wii θ
′
i +
p(1−p)
2pi
∑
i<j
wij
(
(2− p) θ′ij + p θ′i + p θ′j
)
, (19)
where θ′i = fγ(θi), for each i ∈ V , and θ′ij = gγ(θij , θi, θj), for each i, j ∈ V .
On the other hand, since (S2) relaxes the problem of computing the best IE strategy with pricing
probability p, the revenue of the best IE(A, p) strategy is at most:
p(1−p)
2
∑
i∈V
wii(1− cos θi) + p(1−p)4
∑
i<j
wij (2 + p− p cos θi − p cos θj − (2− p) cos θij) (20)
The approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) is derived as the minimum ratio of any pair of terms in
(19) and (20) corresponding either to the same loop {i, i} or to the same edge {i, j}, i < j. Therefore,
the approximation ratio of SDP-IE(p, γ) for undirected social networks is the minimum of ρ1(γ) and
ρ2(p, γ), where:
ρ1(γ) =
2
pi
min
0≤x≤pi
fγ(x)
1− cosx and
ρ2(p, γ) =
2
pi
min
0≤x,y,z≤pi
(2− p) gγ(x, y, z) + pfγ(y) + pfγ(z)
2 + p− p cos y − p cos z − (2− p) cosx
s.t. cosx+ cos y + cos z ≥ −1
cosx− cos y − cos z ≥ −1
− cosx− cos y + cos z ≥ −1
− cosx+ cos y − cos z ≥ −1
It can be shown numerically, that ρ1(0.209) ≥ 0.9035 and that ρ2(0.586, 0.209) ≥ 0.9032. uunionsq
Combining Theorem 6 and Theorem 1, we conclude that:
Theorem 7. For any undirected social networkG, the IE strategy computed by SDP-IE(0.586, 0.209)
approximates the maximum revenue of G within a factor of 0.8229.
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Remark. We can use ρ(p, γ) and min{ρ1(γ), ρ2(p, γ)}, and compute the approximation ratio of
SDP-IE(p, γ) for the best IE strategy with any given pricing probability p ∈ [1/2, 1). We note that
ρ1(γ) is ≈ 0.87856, for γ = 0 (see e.g. [10, Lemma 3.5]), and increases slowly with γ. Viewed as a
function of p, the value of γ maximizing ρ(p, γ) and ρ2(p, γ) and the corresponding approximation
ratio for the revenue of the best IE strategy increase slowly with p (see also Fig 2 about the depen-
dence of γ and the approximation ratio as a function of p). For example, for directed social networks,
the approximation ratio of SDP-IE(0.5, 0.653) (resp. SDP-IE(0.52, 0.685) and SDP-IE(0.52, 0.704))
is 0.8942 (resp. 0.8955 and 0.9005). For undirected networks, the ratio of SDP-IE(0.5, 0.176) (resp.
SDP-IE(0.52, 0.183) and SDP-IE(2/3, 0.425)) is 0.899 (resp. 0.9005 and 0.907). uunionsq
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A Appendix
A.1 Undirected Social Networks: An Example of a Suboptimal Ordering
We consider an (undirected) simple cycle with 4 nodes, numbered as they appear on the cycle, and unit
weights on its edges. Proposition 3 shows that the optimal ordering is (1, 3, 2, 4), the optimal pricing
vector is (1, 0.5, 1, 0.5), and the maximum revenue is 1. On the other hand, if the nodes are ordered as
they appear in the cycle, i.e., as in (1, 2, 3, 4), the optimal pricing vector is (1,
√
2/2, (1+
√
2)/2, 0.5),
and the resulting revenue is 0.7772.
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A.2 On the Approximability of Maximum Revenue in the Uniform Additive Model
We show a simple example where different acyclic subgraphs (equivalently, different vertex orderings)
of the social network allow for a different fraction of their edge weight to be translated into revenue.
To this end, we consider a simple directed network G on V = {u1, u2, u3, u4}. G contains an edge
from each vertex ui to each vertex uj with j > i, that is 6 edges in total. Formally, E = {(ui, uj) :
1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4}. The weight of each edge is 1.
In orderingpi1 = (u1, u2, u3, u4), all edges go forward. So,pi1 corresponds to an acyclic subgraph
with edge weight 6. The optimal pricing probabilities for pi1 are p1 = (1, 0.7474, 0.5715, 0.5) and
extract a revenue of R(pi1,p1) = 1.1964 from G. Thus, pi1 allows for a revenue equal to 19.943% of
its edge weight.
Similarly, ordering pi2 = (u1, u3, u2, u4) corresponds to an acyclic subgraph with edge weight
5. The optimal pricing probabilities for pi2 are p2 = (1, 0.625, 0.625, 0.5) and extract a revenue of
R(pi2,p2) = 1.03125. So, pi2 allows for a revenue equal to 20.625% of its edge weight.
Ordering pi3 = (u2, u1, u3, u4) also corresponds to an acyclic subgraph with edge weight 5. The
optimal pricing probabilities for pi3 are p3 = (1, 1, 0.5625, 0.5) and extract a revenue ofR(pi3,p3) =
1.1328. Thus, pi3 allows for revenue equal to 22.656% of its edge weight. Also, the revenue extracted
by IE({u1, u2}, 0.5147) is 1.0634. Thus, pi3 allows for an IE strategy extracting a revenue equal to
21.268% of its edge weight.
IE({u1, u2}, 0.5147), for example, approximates the maximum revenue of G within a factor of
1.0634
1.1964 ≈ 0.8888. On the other hand, if we consider a random ordering of u1 and u2 and of u3 and
u4, we obtain a vertex ordering pi′, which combined with p1, gives an expected revenue of ≈ 1.0306.
Hence, (pi′,p) approximates the maximum revenue of G under p1 within a factor of 1.03061.1964 ≈ 0.8614.
On the other hand, pi′ defines an acyclic subgraph of G which has an expected edge weight of 5 and
approximates the edge weight of the maximum acyclic subgraph of G within a factor of 56 ≈ 0.8333.
uunionsq
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